Square of Opposition and Theism 2

We have the following categorical proposition:

A: All things are eternal
E: No things are eternal
I: Some things are eternal
O: Some things are not eternal

If Xianity is true, then A is false, E is false, I is true, and O is true. 
Why? On Xianity, only God is eternal (some think that Xianity is compatible with the eternal existence of some abstract objects—sets, numbers, properties, propositions, etc; but let’s ignore this for now since granting it does not substantially change anything below) and God is not the only being that exists. Hence everything other than God is not eternal. Hence, some things are not eternal. Hence, on Xianity both I and O are true. 

Ok, so one (perhaps small but not insignificant) step towards showing that God is exists is to show that the E proposition above is false. 

Step 1: Show that ‘No thing is eternal’ is false.
One way to do this (not the only way, and perhaps not even the best way) is consider the obverse of ‘No thing is eternal.’

E. No thing is eternal

Obverse = All things are non-eternal

That is, the obverse of our E statement is the claim that everything that exists (every event, process, substance, object, etc) is non-eternal. 

Now to be non-eternal is to have either no beginning with an end or to have a beginning. That is, if something have no beginning but has an end, then it is non-eternal. If something has a beginning (and either has an end or does not), then it is non-eternal. So, let’s translate our obverted E so as to make all of this explicit. 

Obverted E: All things are either beginningless & have an end or have a beginning

So, to show that our E is false, we need to show that it is false that All things are either beginningless & have on end or have a beginning. Or stating it a bit more clearly, we need to show that the following are false

1. All things are beginningless and have an end 
2. All things have a beginning (i.e. everything began to exist)

(What about this: perhaps some things are beginningless and have an end and the rest have a beginning—a mix of 1 and 2? We will see why there is decent reason not to consider this a bit later)

Question: How would you go about showing that both 1 and 2 are false?



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